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Abstract
We investigate the relationship between market concentration and
industry innovative e¤ort within a familiar two-stage model of R&D
race in which rms compete à la Cournot in the product market.
With the help of numerical simulations, we show that such a setting
is rich enough to generate Arrovian, Schumpeterian and inverted-U
curves. We interpret these di¤erent patterns on the basis of the rela-
tive strength of the technological incentive and the strategic incentive.
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1 Introduction
In a seminal paper, Aghion et al. (2005) collect a robust empirical evidence
about the relationship between product market concentration and the in-
tensity of innovative activity. They show that such relationship follows an
inverted-U shape pattern with respect to market concentration as measured
by an appropriately dened Lerner index. They then go on to rationalize such
curve by means of a model in which technologically asymmetric rms strive
for improving their cost gap in R&D races under uncertainty. Innovation
occur step-by-step and the e¤ect of market competition on R&D investment
results from the balance between what they call the Schumpeteriane¤ect
and the escaping competitionincentive.
Aghion et al. (2005) have then revitalized the old debate about the re-
lationship between market structure and innovation. Such debate (see Rein-
ganum, 1989, for an excellent survey) was mostly focussed on a binary menu
contrasting the arguments behind Schumpeter (1942) well-known alleged su-
periority of monopoly in driving innovative activity and the opposite con-
clusion by Arrow (1962). By showing that the relationship may exhibit an
inverted-U shape, they provide an important empirical contribution; more-
over, their model o¤ers a theoretical frame accomodating such pattern.1
In this paper we show that another, arguably simpler model of product
market competition and innovation may predict an inverted-U shape curve.
1On the inverted-U shape relationship, see the empirical evidence collected by Manseld
et al. (1968). To the best of our knowledge, the rst scholars hinting at such shape within a
theoretical model are Kamien and Schwartz (1976). They address the reported empirical
nding that the rate of innovative activity increases with the intensity of rivalry up to a
point, peaks, and declines thereafter with further increase in the competitiveness of the
industry (Kamien and Schwartz, 1976, p. 247). However, they do not explicitly model
the R&D race as a game, and the prize to the winner is independent of the intensity of
rivalry.
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We borrow from the game-theoretic literature utilized in the 90s and follow
Lee andWilde (1980). However, we do not blackbox as they do the nature
of market competition, but we model it explicitly as a homogeneous oligopoly
à la Cournot. In such a static two-stage game of R&D, rms participate in an
uncertain race to get a non-drastic cost-reducing innovation which will allow
the winner to compete with a cost advantage in the market game. There is no
spillover and Cournot competition in the product market allows all (initially
identical) rms to be active also in the asymmetric post-innovation non-
cooperative equilibrium. For sake of tractability, we adopt a linear-quadratic
specication of the R&D technology and the market game of Lee and Wilde
(1980) as in Delbono and Denicolò (1991), where it is shown that, under
Cournot competition in the product market,2 aggregate R&D may respond
both ways to increases in market concentration. However, the large number
of parameters prevents us from deriving clear-cut analytical conclusions as
for the existence of an inverted-U shape relationship. Hence, we resort to
numerical simulations and show the emergence of such a shape. Moreover,
albeit simple, our model is rich enough to generate also an Arrovian as well
as a Schumpeterian behaviour in the relationship between aggregate R&D
e¤ort and the numerosity of rms.
Specically, it turns out that, for a given market size, if the innovation is
non-drastic:
1. A low productivity of the R&D technology (and/or a high level of
the discount rate) yields a Schumpeterian relationship, e.g. the equilibrium
aggregate R&D e¤ort reaches its peak under monopoly and then monotoni-
cally decreases with the number of rms. This holds irrespective of the size
2The rst attempt of modelling the market game as a Cournot one to investigate the
relationship between innovation and concentration is Horowitz (1963); see also Scherer
(1965, 1967). Stewart (1983) drops the winner-takes-all assumption in the Lee and
Wildes model, but he does not model explicitly the market game.
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of the innovation.
2. When the productivity of the R&D technology is high (and/or the
level of the discount factor is low), then two scenarios emerge, depending on
the magnitude of the cost reduction reached by the winning rm.
2a. If such a reduction is small w.r.t. the given market size, then we
detect an inverted-U shape curve between aggregate R&D and the number
of rms.
2b. If the cost reduction is large - making the innovation almost dras-
tic - then we observe an Arrovian pattern, e.g., the aggregate investment
monotonically grows with the number of rms.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we set the background. In
section 3 we specialise the general model and summarize the ndings from
a large number of numerical simulations by providing some intuition behind
di¤erent patterns. Section 4 concludes.
2 The background
Consider n identical rms investing in R&D to be rst in getting a techno-
logical improvement. Firms act noncooperatively and choose an investment
expenditure x to maximise the discounted stream of expected prots. Tech-
nological uncertainty is of the exponential type, i.e., the discovery time is
described by an exponential (or Poisson, or memoryless) distribution func-
tion. Firm i = 1; 2; :::n then maximises the following payo¤

i =
Z 1
0
e (r+H)t [h (xi)Vi +Hivi + i   xi] dt (1)
where r > 0 is the common discount rate, h (xi) is is hazard rate (i.e., the
instantaneous probability of innovating conditional upon not having inno-
vated before), H =
Pn
i=1 h (xi) ; Hi = H   h (xi) ; i are is current gross
prots, Vi (vi) is the discounted continuation value of the game if i wins
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(loses) the race. This is the formulation of Lee and Wilde (1980) which mod-
ies Lourys (1979) as for the specication of the R&D cost. Here, they are
non-contractual, that is, a xed rate of spending xi until a rm succeeds.
As for the hazard function, it is assumed that it is strictly concave, h (0) =
0 = limxi!1 h
0 (xi) and limxi!1 h
0 (xi) = 1: These are the so-called Inada
conditions ensuring the existence of an interior solution and the satisfaction
of the second order condition.
The specication of the nature of the R&D cost matters as for the com-
parative statics properties of the model. Indeed, while Loury (1979) proves
that, in the Nash equilibrium, the optimal individual R&D e¤ort decreases
in the number of rms, Lee and Wilde (1980) prove the opposite.3
Slightly later, a parallel debate started on the relationship between market
power and the incentive to get an exogenous innovation, with Gilbert and
Newbery (1982, 1984) and Reinganum (1983), reaching opposite conclusions
about the persistence of monopoly. This discussion echoes the old dichotomy
between Schumpeter (1942) and Arrow (1962). The subsequent literature
focusses on the impact of industry structure or the intensity of competition
(e.g., Bertrand vs Cournot) for a given market structure on the aggregate
investment in R&D, and is accurately accounted for in Tirole (1988) and
Reinganum (1989), inter alia. On the basis of the original contraposition
between Schumpeterian and the Arrovian views, the main concern dealt with
3In Lourys (1979) formulation, the rms maximand is:

i =
Z 1
0
e (r+H)t [h (xi)Vi +Hivi + i] dt  xi
where xi is a lump-sum paid by rm i at the outset. The intuition behind these con-
clusions is simple. In the Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) and Loury model, an increase in
the number of rms reduces the expected benet to investment... leaving expected costs
unchanged. The rm responds by reducing investment. In the Lee and Wilde model, both
expected benets and expected costs are reduced by the addition of another rm... and
the net e¤ect is to enhance incentives to invest(Reinganum, 1984, p. 62).
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the sign of the monotonicity of the aggregate innovative e¤ort w.r.t. industry
structure. Aghion et al. (2005), instead, show the emergence of a concave and
single-peaked relationship from the data and rationalise it with a theoretical
model.
In this paper, we aim at showing that the early approach using stochastic
race models along the lines of Loury (1979), Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980), Lee
andWilde (1980) and Reinganum (1983) may indeed generate both monotone
patterns as well as the inverted-U shape one.
To do so, we make a further step by specifying the nature of prizes in
the race, following Delbono and Denicolò (1991) who consider rms striving
for a non drastic cost-reducing innovation and Cournot competition in the
market game. The expected stream of discounted prots for rm i becomes:

i =
h (xi) 

W=r +Hi

L=r + 
C   xi
r +Hi + h (xi)
(2)
where W is the instantaneous prot accruing forever to the winner of the
R&D race, L is the instantaneous prot accruing forever to each loser, and
C is the instantaneous prot in the pre-innovation symmetric Cournot equi-
librium. In the symmetric equilibrium, the following condition must hold:
(W   L) (n  1)h (xi)h0 (xi)
r
+
 
W   C

h0 (xi) r nh (xi)+xh0 (xi) = 0
(3)
It can be shown (Beath et al., 1989; and Delbono and Denicolò, 1990)
that the equilibrium R&D e¤ort is increasing in both W  C and W  L.
Let us label the former as technological incentive and the latter as strategic
incentive. Notice that W   C is the di¤erence between the prot of the
winner and the current prot. Such a di¤erence captures what has been called
the prot incentiveby Beath et al. (1989), the stand alone incentiveby
Katz and Shapiro (1987) and it is related to - but it doesnt coincide with -
the replacement e¤ectin Fudenberg and Tirole (1986) who follow Arrows
(1962) expression.
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On the other hand, W   L is the di¤erence in prots between winning
and losing the race, and it captures what has been named as the competitive
threat by Beath et al. (1989), the incentive to pre-empt by Katz and
Shapiro (1987) and the e¢ ciency e¤ect by Fudenberg and Tirole (1986)
and Tirole (1988).
From the standpoint of the debate inaugurated by Aghion et al. (2005),4
we can single out an elementary property of the aggregate R&D e¤ort which
was rst underlined in Delbono and Denicolò (1991, p. 959). Writing the
individual symmetric equilibrium e¤ort as x (n) ; we clearly have5
@ (nx (n))
@n
= x (n) + n  @x
 (n)
@n
= x (n)

1 +
n
x (n)
 @x
 (n)
@n

(4)
which, if @x (n) =@n < 0; may be nil for some n (possibly more than once, as
the expression in square brackets will not be linear w.r.t. n, in general). This
amounts to saying that @x (n) =@n < 0 is a necessary (but not su¢ cient) con-
dition for the arising of inverted Us. This fact could have triggered a deeper
investigation of the relationship between aggregate e¤ort and market struc-
ture in the vein of the debate between Schumpeter (1942) and Arrow (1962),
possibly spotting a non-monotone behaviour as in Aghion et al. (2005). If
this idea had emerged at the time, one should have tried to sign the following
expression:
@2 (nx (n))
@n2
= 2  @x
 (n)
@n
+ n  @
2x (n)
@n2
(5)
In (5), the sign of @x (n) =@n was established, on the basis of various speci-
cations of the model.6 Conversely, the sign of @2x (n) =@n2 has never been
discussed, as (5), in itself, was not considered.
4See Aghion et al. (2015) for an updated account of such a debate.
5Wherever useful, we follow this literature by treating n as a continuous variable.
6If the winner takes all, under contractual R&D costs as in Loury (1979) and Dasgupta
and Stiglitz (1980), the sign is negative. Therefore, in their setting, one might have
envisaged a peak in industry e¤ort w.r.t. concentration, because (4) may vanish for some
values of n. Under non-contractual costs, as in Lee and Wilde (1980), it is positive; under
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What we are setting out to do in the remainder of the paper is to specify
all of the components of (2) as in Delbono and Denicolò (1991) to show the
arising of both Schumpeterian and Arrovian patterns of aggregate R&D as
well as an inverted-U shaped curve as in Aghion et al. (2005).
3 The specialised model
We consider the homogeneous Cournot model with a linear demand p = a Q
and a constant marginal production cost initially equal to c 2 (0; a). If one
denes the initial market size as s  a c and the cost reduction as d  c c,
where c is the new marginal cost patented by the winner of the R&D race
(s > d because we focus on non-drastic innovation), then the relevant prots
to be substituted into (2) are
W =
(s+ nd)2
(n+ 1)2
; L =
(s  d)2
(n+ 1)2
; C =
s2
(n+ 1)2
(6)
As for the hazard function, we stipulate that h (xi) = 2
p
xi; where  is a
positive parameter measuring the e¢ ciency of R&D expenditure. In what
follows, we consistently use   =r to save on notation.
Given the triple of prots in (6) and the above specication of the haz-
ard function, the rst order condition (FOC) taken on (2) w.r.t. xi; under
symmetry, is
  (2n  1)x+ 22 (n  1) (W   L)  1px+   W   C
[2n
p
x+ 1]
2p
x
= 0 (7)
which yields:
x =
 + 22 [W + 2 (n  1) L  	] 
q
 + 42 [	 + nW + (n  1) L]
22 (2n  1)2
(8)
non-contractual R&D costs and Cournot competition, as in Delbono and Denicolò (1991),
the sign may change.
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where 	  (2n  1) C ;   1 + 44 (n  1)2 (W   L)2 and   1  
22 (n  1) (W   L). Notice that
sign (x+   x ) = sign () (9)
and  = 0 at
 = 
s
n+ 1
2d (n  1) [2s+ d (n  1)] (10)
which, considering that  > 0; implies
 > 0 8  2

0; + 
r
n+ 1
2d (n  1) [2s+ d (n  1)]

 < 0 8  > +
(11)
Before proceeding, it is worth noting that limn!1 + = 1; limn!1 + = 0;
@+=@n < 0 and @2+=@n2 > 0. That is, (i) + is decreasing and convex in
n; (ii) in monopoly,  > 0 surely; and nally (iii) under perfect competition,
 < 0 surely.
Since the numerator of the expression on the l.h.s. in (7) is concave in x,
the foregoing analysis proves
Proposition 1 x = max fx ; x+g is the equilibrium individual R&D e¤ort,
with
max fx ; x+g = x+ 8  2 (0; +)
max fx ; x+g = x  8  > +
This Proposition, in combination with the limit properties of +; entails
that when n = 1; the relevant R&D e¤ort is xM = x+jn=1 ; if instead n
becomes innitely large, the equilibrium R&D e¤ort is limn!1 x .
We are now in a position to assess the impact of industry structure on
the aggregate R&D e¤ort.
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3.1 Schumpeter, Arrow, and inverted-Us
Dene the aggregate equilibrium investment as X = nx. Despite the use
of an extremely simplied specication of the model, X remains highly non
linear in n; which prevents the analytical treatment of the problem under
scrutiny and calls for numerical simulations.7 We distinguish two cases, de-
pending on the size of  = =r.8 Hence, what follows lends itself to a twofold
interpretation, which can focus either on the productivity of R&D for a given
level of impatience, or the opposite. In both scenarios, we set parameter val-
ues so that (2) be positive.
Scenario I:   + In this case,  and r are set so as to identify values of
 2 (0; +] : Hence, by Proposition 1, aggregate e¤ort is X+ = nx+.
First of all, we evaluate the behaviour ofX+ w.r.t. n in n = 1:Were the
aggregate e¤ort be increasing in n under monopoly, this would exclude
a Schumpeterian pattern. To see that this is not the case, note that
the following derivative:
@X+
@n

n=1
=  6 (1 + ) + d
2

4d2s2 + d
 
8s22 + 3

+ 2s (8 + 5)

42
(12)
where  
q
1 + d (d+ 2s) 2, is clearly negative. Moreover, the limit
values of X+ are:
X+

n=1
=
d (d+ 2s) 2 + 2 (1 + )
42
> 0
limn!1X+ = 0
(13)
7We have performed simulations using the ManipulatePlot device in Wolframs Math-
ematica 10.1.
8In Delbono and Denicolò (1991), only one solution is considered because attention
is focussed on low values of ; in particular so low that the second-order e¤ects of R&D
e¢ ciency (or impatience, as measured by r) can be neglected.
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These properties, of course, do not exclude a non-monotone behaviour
of industry investment in some range of n greater than one but not
arbitrarily large. For this reason we switch to numerical simulations,
xing once and for all s = 1. We have performed simulations using the
following parameter constellations:
n 2 [1; 100] ; d 2 [1=100; 10] ;  2 [1=100; 1] (14)
focussing on cases where s > d; x+ > 0 and 
i
 
x+
  0. The quali-
tative properties of the pattern emerging from this simulation are de-
picted in Figure 1, displaying a Schumpeterian behaviour of aggregate
investment w.r.t. industry structure, as X+ consistently looks decreas-
ing and convex in n.9
9If  = +; the aggregate industry e¤ort is nx+ = nx

  and its expression is
X =
dn2 (2s+ nd)
(n+ 1)
2
(2n  1)
which is decreasing and convex in n for all s > d.
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Figure 1 The Schumpeterian case
6
-
X
n(1; 0)
The curve appearing in Figure 1 has been obtained by setting d = 1=50
and  = 3=2. These values describe a situation in which the cost
reduction is very small and the e¢ ciency of R&D (time discounting)
is very low (high). This amounts to saying that the winner gains a
very small prot increase and the remaining n  1 rms lose very little
as compared to the ex ante symmetric equilibrium. This drives the
Schumpeterian outcome.
Some intuition behind the Schumpeterian pattern may rely upon the
technological incentive vis à vis the strategic one. A necessary condi-
tion for the aggregate e¤ort to be decreasing in n is that xM > x

+, and
this inequality certainly holds if both incentives are greater for the mo-
nopolist than for the generic oligopolist. Straightforward calculations
show that the strategic incentive is always greater for the monopolist,
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whereas the technological incentive is greater for the monopolist when
the cost reduction is small.
Scenario II:  > + In this case,  and r are set so as to identify values of
 > +: Hence, by Proposition 1, aggregate e¤ort is now X  = nx  for
n  2; while xM = x+jn=1.
To begin with, observe that
sign
@X 
@n

n=1
= sign (15)
where
  6 + d2 3d+ 16s+ 4ds (d+ 2s) 2  (16)
2
q
1 + d2 (d+ 2s)
 
3 + 5ds2

> 0
This clearly rules out a Schumpeterian pattern, while leaving open both
possibilities for an Arrovian behaviour or an inverted-U shape curve.
Making ourselves sure again that s > d; x  > 0 and 
i
 
x 
  0, our
numerical simulations illustrate that an Arrovian pattern emerges when
the cost reduction is large vis à vis market size, whereby the model is
close to a winner-takes-allsetup, while a concave and single-peaked
pattern may obtain if the innovation is small.
The fact that X  is monotonically increasing in n when  is large and
the innovation is almost drastic is intuitively due to the fact that, in
such a case, the prize to the winner is very close to the pure monopoly
prots associated with the new technology. Notice that a su¢ cient
condition to obtain an Arrovian pattern is that both the technological
and the strategic incentives are greater for the oligopolist than for the
monopolist. Suppose the innovation is drastic (d = s) ; then, the tech-
nological incentive is greater for the oligopolist, whereas the strategic
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incentive is identical across rms. By continuity, if d is lower than s but
close to it, also the strategic incentive is greater for the oligopolist.10
For instance, keeping s at 1 and taking as a reference set of intervals
the following:
n 2 [1; 100] ; d 2 [1=100; 10] ;  2 [1=100; 100] ; (17)
one has to take into account the constraint  > +; which depends on
fd; ng. A pair which surely satises this constraint is fd = 1=2;  = 50g
and this generates the Arrovian graph appearing in Figure 2, where
the curve starts at n = 2 and the optimal monopoly e¤ort x+jn=1 is
identied by the at line.
Figure 2 The Arrovian case
6
-
X
n(1; 0)
xM
10Incidentally, this is precisely the setting considered by Reinganum (1983) in her reply
to Gilbert and Newbery (1982).
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The remaining pattern, which is in Figure 3, reects the inverted-U
shape we know from Aghion et al. (2005). In our setting, such a curve
emerges when the cost reduction is very small as compared to market
size. Taking as a general reference (17), then xing fd = 1=100;  = 50g ;
and accounting for the integer constraint on n, the peak of X  is in
correspondence of n = 3; with X  ' 0:122; while xM ' 0:007.
Figure 3 The inverted-U case
6
-
X
n(1; 0)
xM
The intuition behind this curve may rely upon the contrast between the
small technological gain and the price e¤ect driven by the numerosity
of rivals. In a highly concentrated oligopoly, the gain from the R&D
investment (which is highly productive) prevails and the curve looks like
the Arrovian one. As market competition intensies and erodes prots,
the opposite applies and the curve slopes downwards as in Schumpeter.
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4 Concluding remarks
The long-standing debate about the impact of industry structure on aggre-
gate innovative activity has been revitalised by Aghion et al. (2005) putting
in evidence a concave non-monotone behaviour in sharp contrast with Schum-
peter (1942) and Arrow (1962). This has triggered a new stream of research
aimed at modelling this inverted-U shape relationship emerging from empir-
ical evidence.
We have participated in this research by revisiting the model in Delbono
and Denicolò (1991), where a hint in this direction was already suggested.
Although the complexity of the model requires resorting to numerical sim-
ulation, it is nonetheless true that the conclusions we reach are robust to
the specication of parameters and, more importantly, lend themselves to
an interpretation in line with the intuition inherited from a well established
tradition.
In summary, our ndings can be spelled out as follows. If innovations
are non-drastic, for a given market size: (i) a Schumpeterian pattern is gen-
erated by a low productivity of the R&D technology, or, equivalently, high
discounting, regardless of the innovation size; (ii) the Arrovian and non-
monotone patterns arise when R&D e¢ ciency is high, or discounting is low.
The former is driven by large innovations, while the latter by small ones.
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